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"After all, what is the First Amendment about if not about one's sub-
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I. INTRODUCTION
ECENT Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Free Exercise
Clause have generated more heat than light and have led many of
the religious faithful to claim that free exercise protections have
been eviscerated. The most recent development featured a contest be-
tween Congress and the Supreme Court, with the Supreme Court reas-
serting its power of judicial interpretation in City of Boerne v. Flores,2 by
invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act3 (RFRA), a Con-
gressional attempt to reverse the Supreme Court's earlier ruling in Em-
ployment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.4
Those in the land use and planning communities have watched these
developments with interest. Although neither Smith nor RFRA ex-
pressly addresses zoning, they both focus on so-called neutral, generally
applicable laws and have been applied by lower courts in free exercise
challenges to zoning ordinances. 5 Flores presented both zoning and free
1. Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 883 (D. Md. 1996).
2. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-4 (1994).
4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5. See, e.g., Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir.
1991) (applying Smith); Health Services Div., Health and Env't Dept. of New Mexico v.
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exercise issues and leaves many with the impression that the minimal
scrutiny articulated in Smith has been restored to analysis of free exercise
challenges to zoning ordinances. On its face, Flores invalidates RFRA
and restores the Smith rule 6 that where a law is neutral and generally
applicable, any incidental burden on religious practices thereby does not
offend free exercise. 7 However, this does not, as it may seem, signal the
death knell for religious exemptions from zoning restrictions. Quite the
contrary, post-Smith cases reveal at least four strategies by which reli-
gious challengers are avoiding the Smith rule in zoning cases and invoking
a substantial burden/compelling interest analysis, under which they are
far more likely to prevail. These strategies expose Smith's weaknesses in
the zoning context and demand that it be reconsidered.
This Comment reviews the historical development of both free exercise
and zoning jurisprudence and argues that the most recent Supreme Court
decision does not necessarily restore a deferential review to cases in
which both zoning and free exercise of religion are implicated. Part II
considers the historical underpinnings of zoning and free exercise princi-
ples. Part III examines the current state of the law in these areas, includ-
ing the recent invalidation of RFRA by Flores. Finally, Part IV argues
that Flores does not necessarily signal a return to Smith's minimal scru-
tiny where both zoning and free exercise of religion are at issue.
II. THE HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF ZONING AND
FREE EXERCISE
Religious institutions and zoning ordinances have long been uncom-
fortable bedfellows. Churches and synagogues have played prominent
roles in cities and towns, and in the lives of their citizens, since the na-
tion's founding. Zoning ordinances, while only a part of municipal life
since the early decades of the twentieth century, have quickly gained
prominence; they are now widely used and enjoy substantial judicial def-
erence. 8 The two forces most often collide over the circumstances in
which use districts, landmark designations, and historic districts may, con-
sistent with the Constitution, impact religious practices. Accordingly, this
part describes the historical jurisprudence relating to use district zoning
and historic district zoning generally, free exercise of religion generally,
and the intersection of zoning and free exercise concerns.
Temple Baptist Church, 814 P.2d 130 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (applying Smith); St. Bartholo-
mew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905
(1991) (applying Smith); Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of
District of Columbia, 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994) (applying RFRA).
6. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
7. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.




1. Use Districts Generally
The landmark case of Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Com-
pany established the constitutionality of modern zoning ordinances based
on use distinctions, provided the ordinance is not "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare." 9 This presumption of constitutionality re-
mains the deferential standard by which modern courts evaluate zoning
ordinances.'
While upholding zoning as presumptively constitutional, the Euclid
Court noted that an otherwise constitutional ordinance may effect an un-
constitutional result if it is arbitrary and unreasonable as applied to a
particular tract." Just two years later, the Court was presented with this
exact issue in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, in which it held that an ordi-
nance could not be upheld as applied to plaintiff's property because, as so
applied, it did not promote the health, safety, and welfare of the city.12
Developing jurisprudence drew a distinction between "facial" constitu-
tionality and "as applied" constitutionality. 13 The courts have been par-
ticularly receptive to as-applied challenges because they provide an
appealing middle ground between upholding legislative action and reliev-
ing hardship where legislation is unduly burdensome. 14
2. Historic District Zoning and Landmark Designations Generally
As zoning has grown in popularity as a means to shape community
growth, municipalities have moved beyond traditional use district zoning
to embrace legislation that preserves areas and buildings of historic im-
portance and regulates aesthetic changes in historic areas. Landmark
designation and historic district zoning often restrict the ability of af-
fected property owners to make physical changes to their property, and
proposed changes must typically be approved by a planning commission
or city council. Historic district zoning, as with any zoning scheme, can
be imposed by the appropriate governing body without the consent of
those affected; similarly, landmark designation ordinances seldom require
that the property owner consent to the designation.15
9. 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
10. See, e.g., Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Board of Adjustment of City of St.
Louis, 599 S.W.2d 61, 66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("[A] zoning ordinance ... is subject to the
same historic tests established by our courts ... [wihether the ... ordinance is reasonable
and constitutional or whether it is arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore unconstitu-
tional ....").
11. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
12. 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928).
13. See KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 3.11-.12
(4th ed. 1996).
14. See id. § 3.13.
15. See Alan C. Weinstein, The Myth of Ministry vs. Mortar: A Legal and Policy Anal-
ysis of Landmark Designation of Religious Institutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 91, 102-03 (1992).
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Judicial challenges to historic district ordinances have been largely un-
successful. The challenged ordinance was upheld in one of the leading
cases, City of New Orleans v. Pergament.16 A comprehensive city ordi-
nance enacted controls throughout the famed French Quarter of New Or-
leans, with the intent of preserving not only specific historic buildings, but
also the overall historic and sentimental character of the area. The owner
of a commercial service station, housed in a modern building, failed in
challenging the application of the ordinance to his property, which was
admitted to have no historic or sentimental value. The court concluded
protective measures that preserve the historic, sentimental, and commer-
cial value of the area as a whole fall within the municipality's police
power.17 Similarly, legislation to preserve and protect the historic whal-
ing town of Nantucket, Massachusetts, was upheld as being sufficiently
related to the promotion of the public welfare to be constitutional18
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the issue of his-
toric, landmark legislation, decisively upholding it.19 In explaining its
holding, the Court stated that "this Court has recognized, in a number of
settings, that States and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls
to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable
aesthetic features of a city."' 20 The Court acknowledged that landmark
legislation typically burdens some property owners more severely than
others but dismissed this as a reason to hold the ordinance invalid, saying
"[liegislation designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens
some more than others. '21
B. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
The free exercise of religion is a fundamental constitutional guarantee
secured by the words of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no
law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] .... -22 This guarantee
has been held applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.23
Free exercise jurisprudence in this century has been confusing at best.
One line of cases employed a compelling interest test to free exercise
challenges if the challengers first demonstrated that governmental action
had substantially burdened their religious practices; under this rigorous
test, some courts found free exercise violated,24 while others did not.25 In
16. 5 So. 2d 129 (La. 1941).
17. See id. at 131.
18. See In re Opinion of Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557, 562 (Mass. 1955).
19. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
20. Id. at 129.
21. Id. at 133.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
24. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718-20 (1981); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
25. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989); Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1982);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971).
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sharp contrast, other cases employed a far more deferential review that
resulted in sustaining governmental action regardless of the burden on
the challenger's religious practices. 26 This subsection examines this jar-
ring split.
1. The Development of the Compelling Interest Test in
Free Exercise Challenges
The assertion that the Court's modern approach to free exercise chal-
lenges employs a compelling interest test is often based on two leading
cases: Sherbert v. Verner27 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.28 In Sherbert, the
Court adopted a compelling interest test in evaluating the free exercise
claim of a Seventh Day Adventist who was denied unemployment com-
pensation after having been discharged from a job for refusing to work on
Saturdays, which would have been contrary to her religious beliefs. The
Court first found her religious practices had been burdened. In so find-
ing, the Court made the careful distinction that free exercise may be vio-
lated even if the burden is not a direct prohibition of one's ability to
engage in religious practices but has the effect of discouraging religious
practice: "[T]o condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's
willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively
penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties. '2 9 The Court
then inquired whether the State had a compelling interest that would jus-
tify this infringement and found the State's interest lacking. The Court
also suggested that had the State's interest been compelling, it also would
have had to demonstrate that other means to achieve the same end were
not feasible.30 The Court's reading gave the Free Exercise Clause a wide
berth, calling Sherbert's burden "substantial infringement" and sug-
gesting free exercise rights may only be limited by "grave" circumstances
and "paramount" State interests.31
Likewise in Yoder, the deference to religious practice is clear. Amish
parents, on the basis of religious beliefs, objected to a Wisconsin statute
that required them to send their children to either public or private
school until age sixteen. The parents' preference was to send their chil-
dren to school until completion of the eighth grade; they believed it es-
sential to their religion that after eighth grade their children remain in the
Amish community to learn practical skills and receive religious educa-
tion. The Court found that application of the statute to the Amish would
"gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of [their] religious be-
26. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 458 (1988);
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712
(1986).
27. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
28. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
29. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added).
30. See id. at 407.
31. See id. at 406.
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liefs' '32 and that the State's interest was not compelling enough to justify
such an intrusion.33 In language substantially at odds with more recent
decisions, discussed infra, Part III, the Court stated that "[a] regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitu-
tional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the
free exercise of religion. '34
Though the compelling interest test has recently been seriously lim-
ited, 35 historical adherence to it should not be minimized in hindsight. It
has continually been followed in the context of denial of unemployment
compensation benefits. 36 Outside of this context, it has also been applied
by the courts in free exercise challenges to the payment of Social Security
taxes37 and military conscription 38 (in addition to application in Yoder,
discussed supra, regarding compulsory school attendance).
2. Deferential Review in Pre-1990 Free Exercise Challenges
A distinctly different line of cases adopted a more deferential judicial
review while distinguishing Sherbert, Yoder, and other cases that em-
ployed the compelling interest test. The free exercise challenge in Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association39 came from Native
Americans opposed to governmental plans to build roadways and harvest
timber in forests central to their religious worship ceremonies. Despite
the assertion, undisputed by the government, that the project would have
a "devastating" impact on the Native Americans' religious practices, the
Court found a compelling interest test inappropriate. The Court did not
clearly articulate the standard ultimately used to evaluate the claim but
did suggest that absent evidence that governmental action had the effect
of coercing individuals into actions at odds with their religious beliefs, a
compelling interest test would not apply. In fact, the Court seemed to
suggest no balancing whatsoever of the government's actions and the reli-
gious burden would be required, stating that the line between permissible
and impermissible government action "cannot depend on measuring the
effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual devel-
opment. '40 The Court concluded that the proposed project had neither
penalizing nor coercive effects on the complainants' religious practice and
that the free exercise challenge therefore failed.
The compelling interest test was also rejected in Bowen v. Roy, in
which the Court ultimately denied the free exercise challenge, employing
32. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. at 219.
33. See id. at 221-29.
34. Id. at 220.
35. See infra Part III.
36. In addition to Sherbert, see Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480
U.S. 136 (1987) and Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security Division, 450
U.S. 707 (1981).
37. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
38. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
39. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
40. Id. at 451.
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the familiar rational basis test.41 Native American parents objected to
the use of a Social Security number to identify their daughter for pur-
poses of obtaining welfare benefits. Their objection was based on a reli-
gious belief that to assign a number to their daughter would rob her of
her spirit and inhibit her spiritual growth. Unlike the analysis in Lyng,
the Roy Court emphasized that, given a religion-neutral requirement, an
intent to discriminate against religious beliefs or practices must be
demonstrated to avoid a rational basis review and invoke stricter scru-
tiny.42 Distinguishing Sherbert, which also involved a religion-neutral
law, the Court pointed out that the unemployment compensation scheme
at issue in Sherbert allowed for individual exemptions and that the failure
to extend an exemption to a situation of religious hardship suggested dis-
criminatory intent.4 3 Finding no such intent in the uniform requirement
of a Social Security number, the Court did not find a free exercise
violation.
Seen as a whole, free exercise decisions prior to 1990 ultimately failed
to yield a consistent evaluative standard. Myriad distinctions-such as
whether the challenged ruling permitted individual exemptions,44
whether the conduct at issue posed a threat to the public interest,45 or
whether the challenged action related to administrative governmental
procedures-confused the issue.46 This lack of consistency led one com-
mentator to decry the "slogans and multipart tests that could be manipu-
lated to reach almost any result. ' '47
C. THE HISTORICAL INTERSECTION OF FREE EXERCISE AND ZONING
This judicial ambivalence about free exercise protections is particularly
apparent in cases involving both free exercise and zoning issues.
1. Use Districts and Houses of Worship
Historically, the judiciary tended to give religious uses substantial def-
erence, reasoning that religious activities promote the morals and welfare
of the community.48 For example, in Holy Spirit Association for Unifica-
tion of World Christianity v. Rosenfeld, the court stated that New York
adheres to the "majority view" that religious institutions are inherently
beneficial to the public welfare and should be accommodated where pos-
sible, even if inconvenience to the community results.4 9
41. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
42. Id. at 707-08.
43. See id. at 708.
44. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (interpreting Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
45. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-05 (1961).
46. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. at 699-700.
47. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to
the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 685 (1992).
48. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 13, § 12.21 (discussing judicial deference to religious
uses).
49. 91 A.D.2d 190, 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
[Vol. 52
FREE EXERCISE AND ZONING
Some courts, however, draw a line when the presence of a church
threatens to subvert the overall goals of the zoning districts. The court in
Grace Community Church v. Town of Bethel upheld the town's ordinance,
to the exclusion of the church, citing the adverse traffic and parking im-
pact the church would likely bring to a single family residence zone. 50
The ordinance was found to be reasonable because it did not exclude
churches outright but required them to establish their use as compatible
with residential uses permitted in the zone.51
A common problem for religious organizations in relation to use dis-
trict zoning stems from the use of property for purposes other than wor-
ship services, such as religious schools, fund-raising events, and services
for the homeless and the poor. While use zoning often permits reason-
able "accessory" or "incidental" uses,52 such uses are problematic with
respect to houses of worship, which are often located in, yet somewhat at
odds with, residential zones. For example, using a rational basis test, the
court in City of Las Cruces v. Huerta found that the city requirement of a
special use permit for the operation of a parochial school was a reason-
able requirement that did not infringe on free exercise of religion. 53 The
court concluded that a full-time parochial school was outside the scope of
a church's reasonable accessory uses.54
Other cases, such as Alpine Christian Fellowship v. County Commis-
sioners of Pitkin County,55 take a different approach. In Alpine Christian
Fellowship, a church was permitted in the zone at issue, but a school was
not; the court determined the operation of a school was "integrally re-
lated to the religious belief of the church membership" and that denial of
the permit needed to operate the school would substantially burden the
church's religious practices.56 Deciding the county failed to assert a com-
pelling interest to justify this burden, the court enjoined the county from
enforcing the special use requirement as applied to the church. 57 The
courts are similarly split as to whether religious activity to help the home-
less is a reasonable accessory use.58 It is in the refusal to allow religious
uses in certain districts and the denial of accessory uses where zoning
ordinances are commonly challenged on free exercise grounds, and courts
50. 622 A.2d 591 (Conn. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993).
51. See id. at 596.
52. See Robert Roy, Annotation, Zoning: What Constitutes "Incidental" or "Acces-
sory" Use of Property Zoned, and Primarily Used, For Residential Purposes, 54 A.L.R. 4th
1034, § 2[a] (1988) ("An accessory use is one which is customarily incidental and
subordinate to, and dependent upon, the principal use of a building or property.").
53. 692 P.2d 1331, 1335 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
54. See id. at 1333.
55. 870 F. Supp. 991 (D. Colo. 1994).
56. Id. at 994-95.
57. See id. at 995.
58. Compare First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla., Inc. v. Collier County, 20 F.3d
419, 422-24 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding no free exercise violation where a church had been
forced to close a homeless shelter on the grounds it was not a customary accessory use)
with Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 544-
47 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding free exercise protection for a church program to feed the hungry
that zoning authorities had determined not to be an accessory use).
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struggle with balancing deference to free exercise with deference to the
will of the city's governing body.
2. Historic District and Landmark Zoning and Houses of Worship
Houses of worship often have historical, cultural, and architectural sig-
nificance and thus run headlong into conflicts with municipal landmark
designations and historic district ordinances. When landmark or historic
designations act to restrict the use of property belonging to a house of
worship, free exercise challenges often follow, again with the attendant
judicial attempts to balance the city's interests against the constitutional
guarantee.
Prior to 1990, free exercise challenges to historic district or landmark
legislation were marked by inconsistency. Similar to free exercise chal-
lenges to use districts, courts have struggled with whether deference to
the legislative zoning scheme or deference to religious purposes should
prevail. In Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Board of Adjustment of St.
Louis, 59 a church's constitutional challenge to a historic district ordinance
was evaluated under the deferential standards accorded zoning ordi-
nances. Disregarding the religious status of the objector, the court up-
held the zoning. 60 In contrast, the religious nature of the challenger was
key to invoking a compelling interest test in Society of Jesus of New Eng-
land v. Boston Landmarks Commission,61 which resulted in invalidation
of a landmark designation as applied to plaintiff's church.62
D. SUMMARY
Against this backdrop, the high Court attempted to clarify free exercise
jurisprudence in the 1990s. The following part analyzes the impact of re-
cent developments in free exercise and zoning jurisprudence.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FREE EXERCISE AND
ZONING JURISPRUDENCE
In 1990, the Court's decision in Smith shifted the focus of a free exer-
cise analysis to the nature of the law at issue rather than the nature of the
right threatened.63 Congress's 1993 attempt to shift attention back to the
threat to free exercise by enacting RFRA was rejected by the Court's
decision in Flores in 1997.64 This part examines these developments.
59. 599 S.W. 2d 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
60. See id. at 66 ("An historic district ordinance is essentially a zoning ordinance. As a
zoning ordinance it is subject to the same historic tests established by our courts.") (cita-
tion omitted).
61. 564 N.E. 2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
62. See id. at 574 ("The government interest in historic preservation, though worthy, is
not sufficiently compelling to justify restraints on the free exercise of religion, a right of
primary importance.").
63. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
64. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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While the developments focus somewhat abstractly on neutral laws of
general applicability, they have significant implications for zoning con-
cerns, as discussed in Part IV.
A. THE COURT SHIFTS THE Focus OF FREE EXERCISE:
THE SMITH RULE
1. Smith's Minimal Scrutiny
In Smith, two Native Americans who used peyote (an illegal drug
under the laws of the state) for sacramental purposes were denied unem-
ployment compensation on the ground that their work discharge was jus-
tified due to their use of the illegal substance. They challenged the denial
as an infringement on their right to free exercise of religion. By a narrow
margin, the Court rejected the claim, 65 grounding its decision on the fact
that the law at issue-a criminal drug statute-was religion-neutral and
generally applicable to all citizens. Given this, the Court found any inci-
dental burden on religion insignificant, emphasizing that to depart from
the proposition that all citizens must conform their actions to the laws of
the state would permit citizens to exempt themselves from the law.66 The
Court articulated its concern as follows: "To permit this would be to make
the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. ' 67 In
effect, the Court concluded that only when a law has the intent of burden-
ing religious exercise will a free exercise concern arise: "[I]f prohibiting
the exercise of religion ... is not the object of the [law] but merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision,
the First Amendment has not been offended." 68
In so holding, the Court soundly rejected the Sherbert compelling inter-
est test.69 Prior to Smith, the Court had struggled with whether, and how,
to ascertain the impact of a law on an objector's faith, an inquiry neces-
sary for application of the compelling interest test, which requires a find-
ing that the objector's faith has been substantially burdened.70 In Smith,
the Court concluded that any inquiry into the degree of burden is inap-
propriate: "[C]ourts must not presume to determine the place of a partic-
ular belief in a religion . . . . If the 'compelling interest' test is to be
applied at all, then, it must be applied across the board, to all actions
65. The majority garnered five Justices, three dissented, and one concurred in the
judgment only.
66. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
67. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)).
68. Id. at 878 (emphasis added).
69. See id. at 883-86.
70. Compare Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989) (deciding which beliefs are and are not central to a faith is "not within the judicial
ken") with Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1123-25 (8th Cir. 1984), affd by an equally
divided court sub nor., Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (deciding whether religious
belief is sincerely held is ascertained by referring to scriptures, the beliefs role in the be-
liever's daily life, and by evaluating the believer's sincerity).
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thought to be religiously commanded. '71
The prospect that all laws would be subject to a compelling interest test
when challenged on religious grounds was unacceptable to the Court be-
cause it feared "religious exemptions" from a wide range of societal obli-
gations. 72 In removing any balancing from an inquiry in which the
challenged law is neutral and generally applicable, the Court established
a standard of review, without expressly articulating it as such, that readily
defers to the State's interest over the religious believer's, in the vast ma-
jority of challenges.
2. Exceptions to the Smith Rule
a. Non-Neutrality
The Smith Court recognized three exceptions to the rule of minimal
scrutiny it espoused. The first, and most obvious, is the rule's inapplica-
bility where the challenged law directly impacts religious beliefs or prac-
tices; such a law is in direct conflict with the First Amendment and would
be subject to the strictest scrutiny.73 Moreover, such a law is not religion-
neutral, and thus the Smith rule would not apply.
Similarly, a law that is facially neutral may be subject to heightened
scrutiny if it is determined that it is not, in fact, neutral but rather has the
surreptitious purpose of impacting religious practices. The Court was
presented with this situation just three years after Smith in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.74
In Lukumi, believers in the Santeria faith leased land in the City of
Hialeah and announced plans to found a place of worship there. A regu-
lar component of their faith was to kill animals as an element of worship
and subsequently, to cook and eat the animals. Shortly after the congre-
gation's announcement, the city adopted several ordinances aimed at
prohibiting the slaughter of animals within city limits, ostensibly due to
public health concerns. However, legislative history and strained defini-
tions in the ordinances themselves tended to show that the ordinances
were a veiled attempt to prohibit the ritual killings practiced by Santeria
adherents.75 The Court stated that "the neutrality inquiry leads to one
conclusion: The ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion.
The pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria adherents
and their religious practices."' 76 Because the ordinances lacked substan-
tive neutrality, despite facial neutrality, the Court employed a compelling
interest test rather than the Smith rule of deference, saying that "[a] law
burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general applica-
71. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887-88.
72. See id. at 888-89.
73. See id. at 877-78.
74. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
75. See id. at 534-42.
76. Id. at 542.
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tion must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. '77
b. Availability of Individualized Exemptions
The second exception to the Smith rule applies in contexts in which
individualized exemptions from the provisions of a generally applicable
law are available. Smith distinguished three prior Supreme Court cases in
which a compelling interest test was applied78 on the basis that, in each
case, individualized governmental assessment of the religious objector's
challenge was permitted and therefore the government could not "refuse
to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling
reason."'79 All three cases involved the denial of unemployment compen-
sation, in which the appropriate governmental agency typically considers
the personal circumstances that gave rise to an applicant's unemployment
and makes discretionary exceptions to a bar on unemployment compen-
sation. The Court seemed of two minds about this line of cases, however,
attempting, at one point, to confine them to the unique context of unem-
ployment compensation and, at another point, to establish a principle
that situations in which individualized assessments are permitted may be
subject to the Sherbert test.80
c. Hybrid Claims
The third exception outlined in Smith focuses on so-called hybrid
claims. Smith distinguished prior cases outside the unemployment com-
pensation field that had employed a compelling interest test on the basis
that they had not involved only a free exercise claim but rather a free
exercise claim coupled with another fundamental right, such as freedom
of speech, freedom of press, or the fundamental right of parents to con-
trol their children's education. 81 Noticeably, the Court's only discussion
of why a hybrid claim warrants heightened scrutiny while a free exercise
claim, standing on its own, does not is that cases involving a hybrid claim
"advert[ ] to the non-free-exercise principle involved. ' 82 This purported
explanation, buried in a footnote, amounts to no explanation at all.
3. Objections to the Adoption of the Smith Rule
a. The Dissent and Concurrence in the Judgment
Three Justices in dissent, and Justice O'Connor concurring in the judg-
ment, strongly disagreed with the Smith majority's abandonment of the
77. Id. at 546.
78. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (discussing Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie).
79. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
80. Compare id. at 884 ("Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life
beyond the unemployment compensation field...") with id. at 884 ("[OJur decisions in the
unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hard-
ship' without compelling reason.") (emphasis added).
81. See id. at 881-82 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 882 n.1.
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compelling interest test. Justice O'Connor charged the majority with re-
ducing First Amendment protections to only those "extreme and hypo-
thetical situation[s] in which a State directly targets a religious
practice. ' 83 Justice O'Connor also rejected the Court's attempt to distin-
guish prior cases on the basis of hybrid status 84 and asserted the compel-
ling interest test is both necessary and judicially manageable for
protecting religious liberties.85 Under Justice O'Connor's analysis, a
compelling interest test would apply, but, despite the rigor of the test, the
State's interest in upholding its criminal prohibitions would be paramount
and would permit a burden on the challengers' religious practices. 86
The dissent joined Justice O'Connor's embrace of the compelling inter-
est test and decried the majority's "distorted view" of precedent.87
Under the dissent's analysis, the State's interest was the narrow one of
refusing to make an exception for the religious use of peyote, which some
states apparently permit,88 an interest not sufficiently compelling to jus-
tify the burden it placed on the challengers' religious practices. 89
b. Public Reaction
Public and academic reaction to Smith was emphatically negative.
Commentator Stephen Carter, claiming a majority view among constitu-
tional scholars, declared:
Smith is a much criticized-and justly criticized-decision, and it
shows ... where the current Court's free exercise jurisprudence is
heading: toward . . . a world in which citizens who adopt religious
practices at variance with official state policy are properly made sub-
ject to the coercive authority of the state, which can pressure them to
change those practices. 90
Carter goes on to claim that the Free Exercise Clause has been effectively
reduced to a point at which it "lacks independent content," only giving
rise to judicial protection when it intersects with free speech concerns.91
Others agree.92
B. CONGRESS STEPS IN BY ENACTING THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION Act
In 1993, Congress joined the fray by enacting the Religious Freedom
83. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
84. See id. at 896.
85. See id. at 900-02.
86. See id. at 907.
87. See id. at 908-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 890.
89. See id., 494 U.S. at 910, 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
90. Stephen L. Carter, The Separation of Church and Self, 46 SMU L. REV. 585, 597
(1992).
91. Id. at 598.
92. See, e.g., James D. Gordon, 11I, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV.
91, 91 (1991) ("the Smith Court mistreated precedent [and] used shoddy reasoning");
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1111 (1990) ("There are many ways in which to criticize the Smith decision.").
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Restoration Act (RFRA).93 The Congressional findings and declaration
of purposes that preface RFRA are somewhat unique in their express
rejection of the Smith decision and approval of the decisions Smith lim-
ited -Sherbert and Yoder: "The Congress finds that ... Smith ... virtu-
ally eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion ... The pur-
poses of this chapter are ... to restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert ... and Yoder. . . .,,94 The Act provides that a substan-
tial burden on religious exercise will only be permissible if the govern-
ment shows that its interest is compelling and that its means to achieve
that interest are the least restrictive to further that interest.95 Its applica-
bility extends to all federal and state law and any branch, agency, or offi-
cial of the United States or a state, as well as any person acting under
color of law.96
Congress denied its effort was for the purpose of "reversing" the Smith
decision, but rather claimed the purpose was to "creat[e] a new statutory
right of free exercise in light of [the Supreme Court's] delineation of the
First Amendment's scope."'97 In enacting RFRA, Congress relied on its
authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,98 which pro-
vides "the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation" the due process
and equal protection principles of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 These
principles include, by way of incorporation, the First Amendment guaran-
tee of free exercise of religion. 100 In defending RFRA, counsel for the
United States has argued that RFRA is simply a Congressional effort to
guarantee equal protection of the laws to religious adherents and thus not
substantively different than myriad other civil rights laws enacted by Con-
gress.10 1 Moreover, the argument continues to deny Congress the author-
ity to act in this manner would be to "relegate [Congress] to the
constitutional sidelines. '10 2
C. THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS: BOERNE V. FLORES
The Supreme Court disagreed and invalidated RFRA in Boerne v.
Flores.103
1. Facts of Flores
The first and last challenge to reach the Supreme Court under RFRA
started in the town of Boerne in the Hill Country of Texas. The regional
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-(a)4 (1994).
94. Id. §§ 2000bb-(a)(4), (b)(1).
95. See id. §§ 2000bb-(a)(1) to (b)(1)-(2).
96. See id. §§ 2000bb-(a)(2), 2000bb-(a)(3).
97. Brief for the United States, Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), available in
1997 WL 13201 at *4 [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
98. See id.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
100. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
101. See Brief for the United States, supra note 97, at *7.
102. Id.
103. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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Catholic Archbishop, P.F. Flores, gave permission to the Boerne congre-
gation of St. Peter Catholic Church to expand so as to accommodate a
growing membership. Built in 1923, the church exemplified the Spanish
mission style of architecture of the region's early history and was located
in a city-designated historic preservation district. The church's applica-
tion for a building permit was denied by city authorities on the basis that
the city had an overriding interest in protecting historic landmarks, in-
cluding St. Peter, to preserve the city's cultural heritage. 1 4 This is exactly
the type of historic district zoning that has enjoyed substantial deference
in recent years.' 05
The Archbishop brought suit in federal court on several claims, includ-
ing the claim that the city violated its free exercise of religion under the
Constitution and under RFRA. The district court found RFRA to be an
unconstitutional exercise of Congressional authority.' 0 6 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the Act constitutional. 0 7
2. Invalidation of RFRA
In the Supreme Court, Flores was argued and decided solely on the
issue of whether RFRA exceeded Congressional power under the Four-
teenth Amendment.' 0 8 The Court struck down RFRA, concluding that
Congress had overstepped its authority by effecting a substantive change
in constitutional interpretation annunciated by the Court. 0 9 More im-
portantly for those following these developments with zoning concerns in
mind, the Court discussed RFRA's impermissible violation of federalism.
Echoing the concern it articulated in Smith, the Court asserted that wide-
spread application of a compelling interest test to neutral laws of general
applicability would result in the potential for "religious exemptions" from
myriad regulatory laws enacted for the general public health, safety, and
welfare." 0 This would create a significant litigation burden in the states
and threaten states' authority. The Court concluded: "This is a considera-
ble congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and
general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their
citizens." 1 '
104. See Flores v. Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2157
(1997); Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1997).
105. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
106. See Flores v. Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
107. See Flores v. Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2157
(1997).
108. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168. Consideration of other claims was stayed by the
district court. See Brief for the United States, supra note 97, at *6 n.5.
109. The analysis in Flores centers on the separation of powers issue, which is outside
the scope of this Comment. For purposes of this Comment, the significance of Flores is the
fact that it reinstates the Smith rule of minimal scrutiny to religious challenges to zoning
ordinances.
110. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
1ll. Id.
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3. Restoration of the Smith Rule
Thus, the Flores decision returns the focus of free exercise analysis to
the nature of the law at issue and restores the Smith rule of minimal scru-
tiny. Substantial burden, for whatever reason, is considered a permissible
and inevitable impact of neutral, regulatory laws:
It is a reality of the modern regulatory state that numerous state
laws, such as the zoning regulations at issue here, impose a substan-
tial burden on a large class of individuals. When the exercise of reli-
gion has been burdened in an incidental way by a law of general
application, it does not follow that the persons affected have been
burdened any more than other citizens .... 12
All three dissenters, two of whom were new to the Court since Smith,
continued to question the wisdom of Smith. Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justice Breyer, discussed at length the historical evidence supporting the
view that the Free Exercise Clause protects religious believers from gov-
ernmental interference even if due to generally applicable, neutral laws,
concluding that "[tihe practice of the colonies and early States bears out
the conclusion that, at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified, it was ac-
cepted that government should, when possible, accommodate religious
practice.' 13 According to this analysis, the Smith rule results in a refusal
to inquire whether government might make reasonable efforts to accom-
modate religious practices.1 14
D. SUMMARY
Although Flores undoubtedly signals a return to Smith's deferential re-
view of most regulatory legislation, it does not necessarily establish this
rule in relation to zoning challenges by religious institutions, despite the
fact that Flores itself was such a dispute. Part IV explores this contention.
IV. THE RESTORATION OF THE SMITH RULE BY FLORES
WILL NOT SETTLE FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
IN THE ZONING CONTEXT
Although Flores centers on both free exercise and zoning issues, its
restoration of the Smith rule, despite decisive language, leaves unsettled
the question of free exercise rights in the context of zoning disputes. This
seeming non sequitur stems from the uncertainties inherent in Smith itself
when applied in the zoning context and from apparent judicial dissatisfac-
tion with Smith. This part explores four emerging analyses by which reli-
gious challengers and courts are avoiding application of the Smith rule in
zoning disputes, leading to the conclusion that Flores does little to settle
this area of free exercise jurisprudence.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2182 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 2183.
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A. HYBRID CLAIMS IN THE ZONING CONTEXT
The first analysis by which the Smith rule may be avoided in a zoning
dispute is that of the hybrid claims exception.
1. Religious Architecture as Religious Expression
A particularly weak aspect of Smith, reinvigorated by Flores, is the so-
called hybrid exception to the Smith rule. Under this exception, claims
that represent a hybrid between free exercise rights and another funda-
mental right, such as freedom of expression or the right of parents to
direct the education of their children, will typically call for strict scrutiny,
while free exercise claims standing alone typically will not.115 As noted
earlier, the Court did little to explain the rationale behind this rule." 6
Equally confounding is the fact that in many free exercise claims, free
expression rights are necessarily implicated. In fact, Justice Souter has
asserted that the distinction between an exclusively free exercise claim
and a free exercise claim that also involves free expression is "untenable"
and concluded that most free exercise claims are in fact hybrid claims.
Thus, the hybrid exception threatens to swallow the rule. 1 7 An earlier
Court easily recognized this problem, not only chastising its dissenter for
failing to recognize it but also suggesting that to draw such a distinction
would impermissibly entangle the judiciary in inquiries about the signifi-
cance of words and practices to different believers and to different
faiths. 118 The undeniable overlap between free exercise and free expres-
sion has even led one scholar to call for analyzing all free exercise claims
under the Free Expression Clause. tt 9
When a house of worship is designated as a historic landmark, a free
expression analysis asks whether religious architecture should be consid-
ered religious expression. If so, landmarks legislation is suspect because
it is arguably content-specific regulation that substantially limits owners'
ability to use their property for expressive purposes. 120 One commentator
argues it is content-specific by evoking the following scenario:
Suppose a congregation, in planning a new church, had to get per-
mission from a state agency to have a Romanesque rather than a
Gothic structure, or to put a rose window in the east end of the nave,
or a baptistry at the west, or to have a parish house contiguous to,
115. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 881-82 (1990).
116. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
117. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
118. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
119. See William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Ex-
pression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983).
120. See Thomas Pak, Free Exercise, Free Expression, and Landmarks Preservation, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1813, 1825 (1991).
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rather than detached from, the sanctuary, or to put a cross on top!121
Most likely, such prospective regulatory action would be unconstitu-
tional, yet it is routinely permitted when done retrospectively by a
landmark preservation commission. 122 In essence, then, landmark preser-
vation legislation is content-specific because it attempts to promote the
expression of certain architectural and aesthetic values and suppress
others.123 As another scholar has argued, "[a]lthough [a landmark ordi-
nance] is content-neutral with respect to religion, it is a content-based
regulation with respect to architectural expression."'1 24 A content-based
regulation impacting religious speech demands application of the compel-
ling interest test.125
The above rests, of course, on the premise that religious architecture
should be construed as religious expression. Courts have been extremely
reluctant to draw this conclusion. In fact, zoning controls over architec-
tural design have traditionally been thought of as well within the munici-
pal zoning power and have enjoyed substantial deference, even in some
First Amendment challenges. 126 Prior to 1991, no case had held architec-
ture-religious or not-to be protected by the Free Expression Clause. 127
Interestingly, however, scholarly support for treating architecture as
symbolic expression is nearly universal. 12 8 As Pak has noted, "art histori-
ans generally recognize architecture as art, and the Supreme Court has
noted that artistic expression deserves some First Amendment protection.
Architecture has also been considered deserving of protection as a form
of symbolic expression, which, like other forms of art, demonstrates vari-
ous political, social, or religious ideas. ' ' 12 9
These arguments are even more persuasive in regards to religious ar-
chitecture, which is arguably expressive of religious belief, and thus,
under Widmar, should be protected as free expression. 130 Development
of religious architecture for communicative purposes was inspired in the
Middle Ages by the desire of clergy to communicate religious ideas to a
populace that was illiterate.13 1 Numerous architectural devices have been
employed for centuries to express specific religious sentiments. 132 For ex-
ample, spires have been used to represent aspiration to heaven; floor
121. Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Lim-
its to Landmark Preservation and Architectural Review, 36 VILL. L. REV. 401, 491 n.338
(1991).
122. See id.
123. See id. at 491.
124. Pak, supra note 120, at 1834.
125. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
126. See Pak, supra note 120, at 1824.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id. (citations omitted).
130. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 ("[R]eligious worship and discussion ... are forms of
speech and association protected by the First Amendment.") (emphasis added); see also
infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
131. See Pak, supra note 120, at 1840 n.160; Carmella, supra note 121, at 456.
132. See Pak, supra note 120, at 1840-41.
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plans (e.g., circle or cross configurations) have been used to accentuate a
particular theology about the distinction between laity and clergy; and
certain design and placement of entrance doors have been used to sym-
bolize the gates of heaven.1 33
Moreover, architectural styles evolve in response to shifts in religious
beliefs. For instance, Protestants experimented with religious architec-
ture during the Reformation in response to the revolutionary changes oc-
curring in theology during that time. 134 Even today, debate in religious
circles is intense regarding expression of religious belief through architec-
ture. For example, noted theologian Paul Tillich has called for "sweeping
renovations to de-Catholicize Protestant churches," a proposal that ap-
parently embraces exterior as well as interior design.135 In the end, this
analysis would not only hold religious architecture as protected free ex-
pression, but a landmarks ordinance requiring a house of worship to
"freeze" its architecture in a certain style could be thought of as com-
pelled speech, which is impermissible under the First Amendment. 136
Capitalizing on these very ideas, one state high court found church ar-
chitecture protected as religious expression and, in a free exercise chal-
lenge to a landmark ordinance, applied the Smith hybrid exception on the
basis that both free exercise and free expression rights were impli-
cated. 137 In First Covenant, the City of Seattle designated First Covenant
Church a historic landmark over the objections of the church. As a result
of the designation, First Covenant would be required to apply to the city
for a certificate of approval before making alterations to its exterior.138
Earlier litigation in the case had been decided by the Washington
Supreme Court in favor of the church. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court, the decision was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in
light of Smith, then recently-decided.139 Despite the obvious implication
from the Supreme Court that Smith should compel a different result, the
Washington Supreme Court found the Smith rule inapplicable and again
found in favor of the church.
The court called First Covenant's claim a hybrid claim, implicating free
expression as well as free exercise concerns:
First Covenant claims, and no one disputes, that its church building
itself "is an expression of Christian belief and message" and that con-
veying religious beliefs is part of the building's function. First Cove-
nant reasons that when the State controls the architectural
"proclamation" of religious belief inherent in its church's exterior it
133. See Carmella, supra note 121, at 452-460; Pak, supra note 120, at 1840-43.
134. See Pak, supra note 120, at 1841-42.
135. Carmella, supra note 121, at 473.
136. See id. at 491; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711 (1977) (finding state require-
ment that state motto be displayed on automobile license plate was compelled speech that
infringed on objector's right to refuse to display it on religious grounds).
137. See First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992)
(en banc).
138. See id. at 177-78.
139. See id. at 178.
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effectively burdens religious speech. We agree .... The relationship
between theological doctrine and architectural design is well recog-
nized .... When, as in this case, both are "freighted with religious
meaning" that would be understood by those who view it, then the
regulation of the church's exterior impermissibly infringes on the
religious organization's right to free exercise and free speech. 140
Because of the dual First Amendment concerns, the court employed the
compelling interest test, not Smith's minimal scrutiny.' 41 Under a compel-
ling interest analysis, the city's interest in historic preservation was not
sufficiently compelling to warrant the infringement of First Covenant's
rights to both free exercise and free expression.1 42 Although it remains to
be seen whether other courts will adopt similar reasoning, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court is emphatic, reaffirming the reasoning in First Cove-
nant just four years later.1 43
2. Religious Activities as Religious Expression
In zoning disputes centered on the use of church or synagogue facili-
ties, a parallel free expression question arises: should religious activities
be protected as religious expression? In many non-zoning cases, courts
have already answered this in the affirmative. The religious believer's
right to engage or to refuse to engage in a wide variety of conduct regu-
lated by neutral laws of general applicability for religious reasons has
been upheld, in many cases at least in part, on free expression grounds.
Several cases have established free expression protection for certain
religiously-motivated conduct. In West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, parents sued the state claiming their children had the right to
refuse to salute the American flag for religious reasons. 144 According to
their beliefs, to salute the flag would impermissibly honor a secular sym-
bol. The Court agreed that to salute the flag is a "form of utterance," and
thus the requirement constituted an infringement of both free exercise
and free speech. 145 In another case, a religious objection to mandatory
display of the New Hampshire "Live Free or Die" motto on an automo-
bile license plate was sustained as compelled speech, a violation of the
First Amendment right not to speak, as well as a violation of free exer-
cise.146 In many other cases, the Court has found free speech an integral
part of the analysis when violations of both free speech and free exercise
are invoked.1 47 In fact, this is exactly what the Smith Court recognized in
140. Id. at 182.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 185.
143. First United Methodist Church of Seattle v. Seattle Landmarks Preservation Bd.,
916 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1996) (en banc).
144. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
145. See id. at 632, 642.
146. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
147. See Marshall, supra note 119, at 575-79 (citing cases).
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devising its hybrid claims exception.' 48
These cases arguably culminated in Widmar v. Vincent.149 In Widmar,
non-religious student groups at a public university were provided with
meeting space in university buildings while a religious student group was
denied such access. Because the group's meetings consisted of Bible
study, prayer, and discussion of religious experiences and beliefs, one
might have expected the Court to rest its decision on free exercise
grounds. Interestingly, in finding in favor of the students, the Court
rested on free speech grounds exclusively, saying that "religious worship
and discussion ... are forms of speech and association protected by the
First Amendment."'1' 5
That the religiously-motivated conduct in Wooley, Widmar, and Bar-
nette is protected, in part, as expression, has implications for zoning dis-
putes over religious facility use. Under these decisions, when a religious
body operates a child care facility for the purpose of providing religious
education or a soup kitchen on the grounds that feeding the poor is re-
quired by its beliefs, both free exercise and free expression are involved.
In fact, the issue of where a house of worship is permitted to locate may
implicate both free exercise and free expression concerns, rather than
free exercise concerns alone.' 5' Under Flores and Smith, the hybrid ex-
ception should apply to these situations, and a compelling interest test
should be invoked.
In sum, the hybrid claims exception arguably applies in a great majority
of religious zoning disputes, leaving us to wonder if the Smith rule has
any applicability in this context.
B. INDIVIDUALIZED EXEMPTIONS IN THE ZONING CONTEXT
Perhaps to an even greater extent than the hybrid claims exception, the
individualized exemptions exception threatens to vitiate Smith in the zon-
ing context. This is the second analysis by which religious challengers and
courts are avoiding the Smith rule.
In describing earlier First Amendment cases that employed a compel-
ling interest test in the context of unemployment compensation, the
Smith Court said that where a system of individual exemptions is avail-
able, the government cannot "refuse to extend that system to cases of
'religious hardship' without compelling reason. ' 152 The Court suggested
unemployment compensation legislation is unique in this regard (because
it typically provides for individual review of the reasons for the appli-
cant's unemployment and determination of eligibility for benefits based
148. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
881 (1990).
149. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
150. Id. at 269.
151. See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464,473 (8th Cir. 1991)
(directing the trial court, on remand, to consider a hybrid rights claim where a church
challenged an ordinance prohibiting it from locating in a central business district).
152. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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on that review) and distinguished areas such as criminal laws that are
applied universally. 153
Significantly, zoning ordinances are very similar to unemployment
compensation in this regard because they are usually replete with provi-
sions that allow for individual exceptions, typically in the form of non-
conforming uses, special use permits, and variances. In fact, it is widely
believed that if a zoning ordinance had no such provisions, it would be
constitutionally suspect. It has been said that, "no matter how compre-
hensive a zoning plan may be, it regularly contains some mechanism for
granting variances, amendments, or exemptions for specific uses of spe-
cific pieces of property. No responsibly prepared plan could wholly deny
the need for presently unforeseeable future change."' 154 In addition,
landmark ordinances, perhaps more so than other zoning ordinances, in-
volve extensive individualized assessment. 155 Thus, under the reasoning
of Smith, most, if not all, zoning legislation must be exempted from the
Smith rule and warrants application of the compelling interest test.
Two cases have pursued this line of reasoning, with First Covenant156
again blazing the trail of Smith rule avoidance in the context of zoning
disputes involving a house of worship. The First Covenant Court found
that the individualized exemptions exception required application of the
compelling interest test as much as the hybrid exception did by saying
that "[t]he landmark ordinances at issue here ... invite individualized
assessments of the subject property and the owner's use of such property,
and contain mechanisms for individualized exceptions. The City's
Landmarks Preservation Ordinance is not generally applicable. '157
Likewise, Keeler v. City Council of Cumberland158 concluded a
landmark ordinance could not be considered generally applicable be-
cause of its provisions for individual exceptions. In Keeler, the city re-
fused to permit a church located in a historic district to demolish two
facilities that were purportedly financially draining, so as to establish
smaller, more modern facilities and a parking lot.159 The court found
Smith's minimal scrutiny inappropriate because the ordinance permitted
such extensive individual assessment. The court stated that "Cumber-
land's Historic Preservation Ordinance is significantly different from the
'across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct'
sustained in Smith H. Rather, like the unemployment compensation pro-
grams at issue in Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie, the ordinance 'has in
place a system of individual exemptions."'1 60 Finding the city's interest in
153. See id.
154. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 681-82 (1976) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
155. See Carmella, supra note 121, at 479-81.
156. First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) (en
banc).
157. Id. at 181.
158. 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996).
159. Id. at 880.
160. Id. at 886.
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historic preservation could not be considered compelling, the court sus-
tained the free exercise challenge.161
In short, the individual exemptions exception to Smith presents an-
other serious question as to whether Smith has any relevance in free exer-
cise zoning challenges.
C. ZONING LEGISLATION THAT IS NOT NEUTRAL
The Supreme Court made it clear shortly after Smith that a law that
specifically targets religion, even if facially neutral, would warrant a com-
pelling interest test, not Smith's minimal scrutiny.162 Thus in Lukumi, the
City of Hialeah's use of zoning ordinances to prohibit the practices of
Santeria believers was evaluated using the compelling interest test and
was held to violate Santerians' free exercise rights. 163
A third situation in the zoning context in which the Smith rule is
avoided is when zoning is used for discriminatory purposes. Though the
discriminatory use of zoning ordinances is the exception rather than the
rule, it happens enough to give life to this exceptionTM In Islamic Center
of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville, a free exercise challenge was
brought to challenge the city's denial of a zoning exception.165 The chal-
lengers sought to establish an Islamic center for Muslim students in a
residential district near the city's university. In the district at issue, reli-
gious uses were not permitted, save by exception. However, twenty-five
houses of worship were operating in the district-sixteen as non-con-
forming uses and nine by exception after the ordinance was enacted. 166
The Islamic Center was the only applicant ever denied an exception. 67
Employing a compelling interest analysis, the court found the city could
have no compelling interest in denying this exception while all others, all
of Christian faith, had been granted.' 68 Though Islamic Center was de-
cided prior to Smith, it is the type of case to which a compelling interest
test should apply even under Smith.
Similarly, Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings presented a sit-
uation in which the zoning power was allegedly used in non-neutral, dis-
criminatory ways. 169 The zoning ordinance at issue permitted religious
uses in residential areas, but not in the central business district. The city
justified the exclusion with its concern for the effects of a non-commercial
use on the vitality of the commercial district. However, many other non-
161. See id. at 886-87.
162. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
163. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
164. Clearly, the use of zoning to discriminate against religious bodies invokes equal
protection issues as well as free exercise issues. An analysis of equal protection in the
context of zoning discrimination is outside the scope of this Comment.
165. 840 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988).
166. See id. at 294.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 299.
169. 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991).
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commercial uses-such as a Masonic Lodge, Alcoholics Anonymous, and
a pregnancy counseling center-were permitted in the district. 170 The
court noted that "it is difficult to imagine how a church would displace
commercial activity any more than a second story apartment, which is
permitted.' 7' Such a questionable exclusion of churches and only
churches should, under Smith, be considered not neutral and thus subject
to the compelling interest analysis, not deferential review.
In sum, Smith and Lukumi indicate that legislation that impacts reli-
gious exercise will require the most vigorous scrutiny if it is not neutral;
thus, they provide yet another exception to the Smith rule in zoning
disputes.
D. RELIANCE ON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
FREE EXERCISE GUARANTEES
The fourth manner in which Smith is eluded in zoning disputes is found
in a trend toward judicial reliance on state constitutional grounds to vin-
dicate free exercise rights rather than reliance on the First Amendment.
Many state constitutional provisions on free exercise of religion provide
more extensive protection than the First Amendment. 172 Interestingly,
many such provisions use expressly religious language and many are re-
markably detailed and specific. In over forty of the state documents, in-
vocations of a Supreme Being are followed by numerous terms describing
religious liberty and protecting the rights of conscience, worship, and reli-
gious opinion and exercise from interference, infringement, control, dis-
crimination, preference, persecution, or compulsion. 173
For example, the Massachusetts provision provides:
[N]o subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, lib-
erty, or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious
profession or sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public
peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship. 174
Increasingly, state courts are relying on these provisions to invoke a com-
pelling interest analysis and avoid resting on the Smith rule, which would
otherwise be required in a free exercise challenge under the U.S. Consti-
tution. 175 In fact, two of these decisions were decided on remand from
the U.S. Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the then-recent
Smith decision. 176 In both instances, the state high court refused to find
adherence to Smith required, relying instead on state constitutional
170. See id. at 468 n.3, 470.
171. Id. at 471 n.9.
172. See Angela C. Carrnella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An
Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REv. 275, 287-88 (1993).
173. See id. at 287.
174. MASS CONST. Pt. 1, art. 2.
175. See Carmella, supra note 172, at 279-84.
176. See First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992)




Minnesota started it. Just months after Smith was decided, the Minne-
sota high court reconsidered a challenge by Amish defendants who had
been charged with violating a state statute that required them to display
an emblem to identify their horse-drawn buggy as a slow moving vehi-
cle. 178 The court expressly declined to rely on the First Amendment,
choosing instead to rely on the state constitutional guarantee of free exer-
cise, which is "distinctively stronger." The court noted:
Whereas the first amendment establishes a limit on government ac-
tion at the point of prohibiting the exercise of religion, section 16
precludes even an infringement on or an interference with religious
freedom. Accordingly, government actions that may not constitute
an outright prohibition on religious practices (thus not violating the
first amendment) could nonetheless infringe on or interfere with
those practices, violating the Minnesota Constitution. 79
The court relied on a compelling state interest test to balance the state's
interest in highway safety with the defendants' religious belief that pro-
hibited them from displaying the symbol.180 Under its balancing analysis,
the court found religious liberty a "precious right" but also found the
state's interest in public safety to be fundamental."" It resolved this di-
lemma by pointing to the fact that the state could have made a reasonable
accommodation by permitting the use of reflective tape and a red lan-
tern-an alternative that was acceptable to the Amish and sufficient to
achieve the public safety interest.182
Even more to the point at hand, the First Covenant zoning case, dis-
cussed above for its avoidance of Smith under a First Amendment analy-
sis, also relied on the state constitution to vindicate the church's rights. In
Washington, as in Minnesota, state constitutional free exercise guarantees
are significantly stronger and more elaborate than the First Amendment
Free Exercise Clause. 183 The court concluded its state provision protects
religious worship absolutely and prohibits any conduct that "disturbs" an-
other on the basis of religion. Any religious conduct is protected unless it
is licentious or inconsistent with public peace and safety. 184 Under state
free exercise jurisprudence, a compelling interest analysis was required,
and the city's interest in historic preservation was not compelling because
it was not necessary to prevent a threat to public health or welfare. 185
Another zoning and free exercise case, Society of Jesus of New England
177. This is an interesting twist of fate; the author of Smith, Justice Scalia, is an avid
supporter of states' rights, and at least five states have asserted their right to rely on their
state constitutions to avoid the Smith rule so vociferously advocated by Scalia.
178. See Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 395.
179. Id. at 397.
180. See id. at 398.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 399.
183. See First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 186 (Wash.
1992) (en banc).
184. See id.
185. See id. at 188.
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v. Boston Landmarks Commission, 86 followed suit, this time resting on
state free exercise grounds exclusively. Of the Massachusetts constitu-
tional free exercise provision, the court stated that "[tihis provision
plainly contemplates broad protection for religious worship. The specific
language of art. 2 guarantees freedom of religious belief and religious
practice subject only to the conditions that the public peace not be dis-
turbed and the religious worship of others not be obstructed."1 87 Also
applying a compelling interest test, the court found the religious challeng-
ers prevailed over the city's interest in historic preservation. 188
The trend continues. Two other high courts have analyzed recent free
exercise claims under state constitutional provisions, employing a com-
pelling interest analysis in so doing.189 Some of these decisions make it
clear, in language ranging from matter-of-fact to pointed, that their reli-
ance on state constitutional grounds is motivated by disagreement with
the Smith rule. 190 Even Alaska, which has a free exercise clause identical
to that of the First Amendment, declined to apply the Smith rule and
applied its own compelling interest analysis instead.191
This line of cases represents another method-one of four discussed in
this part-by which Smith's vitality is undermined in zoning disputes.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Smith is untenable in free exercise zoning challenges. Sev-
eral exceptions to Smith-particularly the hybrid claims exception and
the individualized exemptions exception-represent the rule in free exer-
cise zoning disputes more often than the exception. Dissatisfaction with
Smith's jurisprudence is also evidenced by a growing trend in which state
courts rely on state constitutional free exercise guarantees and a compel-
ling interest analysis so as to avoid the Smith test under the First
Amendment.
Furthermore, some members of the Supreme Court, albeit a minority,
are highly critical of the Smith rule, issuing vigorous defenses of the com-
pelling interest analysis. 192 In addition, three Justices have noted with
displeasure that the question of what type of free exercise analysis to ap-
ply in Smith-the very issue on which Smith was decided and which re-
sulted in a major shift in free exercise jurisprudence-was never briefed
186. 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
187. Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 573.
188. See id. at 574.
189. See Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 66 (Me. 1992); Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 281 (Ala. 1994).
190. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396-97 (Minn. 1990); First Covenant, 840
P.2d at 187.
191. See Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280-81.
192. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 891 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Smith, 494 U.S. at 907
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Church of the Lukumi, Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 559 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2176 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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by the parties, who had each briefed the case on the presumption that the
compelling interest test applied. 93
Smith has resulted in an "intolerable tension"194 in free exercise juris-
prudence, all the more so in zoning challenges, which demand special
considerations due to free expression issues, the availability of individual-
ized exemptions, and religious discrimination. Far from settling this issue,
Flores has merely stoked the flames of the fire begun by Smith, flames
that RFRA sought to quench.
193. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 571-74 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("[T]he Smith rule was not subject to 'full-dress argument' prior to its an-
nouncement."); Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Flores, 117 S. Ct. at
2186 (Souter, J., dissenting); Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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